The following paining of The Torino Horse is the essence;

“Life itself must have some interest in not having such a type of self-contradiction die out. For an ascetic life is such a self-contradiction. Here a resentment without equal is in control, something with an insatiable instinct and will to power, which wants to become master, not over something in life but over life itself, over its deepest, strongest, most basic conditions. Here an attempt is being made to use one’s power to block up the sources of that power. Here one directs one’s gaze, with a green malice, against one’s inherent physiological health, particularly against its means of expression—beauty and joy—while one experiences and seeks for a feeling of pleasure in mistrust, atrophy, pain, accident, ugliness, voluntary loss, self-denial, self-flagellation, self-sacrifice. All this is paradoxical to the highest degree. Here we stand in front of a dichotomy which essentially wants to be a dichotomy, which enjoys itself in the midst of this suffering and gets even more self-aware and more triumphant in proportion to the decrease in its own pre-requisite, the physiological capacity for life. ”Triumph in the ultimate agony“—under this supreme sign the ascetic ideal has always fought. Inside this riddle of seduction, in this picture of delight and torment it sees its highest light, its salvation, its final victory. Crux, nux, lux [cross, nut, light]—for the ascetic ideal these are all one thing.”

It was a thunderbolt reading Nietzsche collected poems for the first time, felt like discovering a revelation of his, also over the time and over grasping Nietzsche’s ’philosophy’ more and more, it turns to make any verselet standing along with, let’s say, a piece from Ecce Homo, as a very atypical thing.

Unambiguously the reason for that is correlated to the perspectivism Nietzsche had about the master–slave morality, and the realization of power, and cruelty to pity, “Not to take a thing pathetically.—What we do to benefit ourselves should not bring us in any moral praise, either from others or from ourselves, and the same remark applies to those things which we do to please ourselves. It is looked upon as bon ton among superior men to refrain from taking things pathetically in such cases, and to refrain from all pathetic feelings: the man who has accustomed himself to this has retrieved his naïveté.” Nietzsche, F. W.,; Kennedy, J. M. (2007). The dawn of day. Dover Publications. The problem with this is that the discourse of Nietzsche’s life himself is very pathetic and contradicted to this mentality. Moreover, what’s make me feel how much did it cause pain to him, is that he talked a lot about this ’shame’ of being tired against your own philosophy, the self-adversary! This is what The Torino Horse paining was to, it is not the slave morals hugging the horse nor the master whipping it, the but, a tired ’knight’ against his philosophy:

“عار. ها هو فرس السباق يضرب بحوافره الأرض ويصهل، متشوق للسباق، مُحب للفارس الذي اعتقا د امتطاءه، ولكن ياللعار! لا يستطيع ركوب الفرس، إنه مُتعب. كذا هو المُفكر المتعب أمام فلسفته” Ibid. .

The desire to excite pity. Larochefoucauld is certainly right when, in the most noteworthy passage of his self-portrait (first printed 1658), he warns all those who possess reason against pity, when he advises that it be left to those people of the commonality who (because their actions are not determined by reason) require the passions if they are to be brought to the point of aiding a sufferer or energetically intervening in a case of misfortune; while pity, in his (and Plato’ s) judgment, enfeebles the soul. One should, to be sure, manifest pity, but take care not to possess it; for the unfortunate are so stupid that the manifestation of pity constitutes for them the greatest good in the world. - Perhaps one can warn even more strongly against this having pity if one understands this need felt by the unfortunate, not precisely as stupidity and intellectual deficiency, as a kind of mental disturbance that misfortune brings with it (that, indeed, is how Larochefoucauld seems to conceive it), but as something quite different and more suspicious. Observe children who weep and wail in order that they shall be pitied, and therefore wait for the moment when their condition will be noticed; live among invalids and the mentally afflicted and ask yourself whether their eloquent moaning and complaining, their displaying of misfortune, does not fundamentally have the objective of hurting those who are with them: the pity which these then express is a consolation for the weak and suffering, inasmuch as it shows them that, all their weakness notwithstanding, they possess at any rate one power: the power to hurt. In this feeling of superiority of which the manifestation of pity makes him conscious, the unfortunate man gains a sort of pleasure; in the conceit of his imagination he is still of sufficient import­ ance . to cause affliction in the world . The thirst for pity is thus a thirst for self-enjoyment, and that at the expense of one’s fellow men; it displays man in the whole ruthlessness of his own dear self: but not precisely in his ’stupidity’, as Larochefoucauld thinks. - In the conversations of social life, three-quarters of all questions are asked, three-quarters of all answers given, in order to cause just a little pain to the other party; that is why many people have such a thirst for social life: it makes them aware of their strength. In such countless but very small doses in which malice makes itself felt it is a powerful stimulant to life: just as benevolence, disseminated through the human world in the same form, is the ever available medicine. - But will there be many honest men prepared to admit that causing pain gives pleasure? that one not seldom entertains oneself ­ and entertains oneself well - by mortifying other people, at least in one’s own mind, and by firing off at them the grapeshot of petty malice? Most are too dishonest, and a few too good, to know anything of this puderzdum; and they are welcome to deny if they like that Prosper Merimeet is right when he says: “Sachez aussi qu’il n’y a rien de plus commun que de faire Ie mal pour Ie plaisir de Ie fairet”.